

# Grenfell Tower – One Year On

Following the awful Grenfell Tower fire in west London on 14th June 2017, the UK government have been working closely with industry experts to review the Building Regulations and the design, construction, and management of high-risk buildings.

This presentation will give a summary of the findings from the investigation and the many industry workshops held to uncover the causes of how the Grenfell Tower fire spread. What actions have the UK authorities taken alongside industry stakeholders to try and prevent future tragedies.

Secondly, the presentation will give an update on the ongoing work on the international movement to develop consistent fire safety standards globally for high-risk buildings.

Gary Strong, a Chartered Building Surveyor, Chartered Arbitrator, Chartered Loss Adjuster and Chartered Building Engineer, and practised as a surveyor, building engineer, expert witness and arbitrator for 38 years. Highlights of a successful career are the landmark House of Lords case of Delaware Mansions (Flecksun Ltd) –v- City of Westminster and the Heathrow Tunnel collapse project.

Has spent most of his career investigating fires and rebuilding post-fire, incorporating latest best practice. Is particularly experienced in managing buildings in use, and upgrading/refurbishing to modern codes. Currently responsible for developing standards and guidance for RICS professionals globally in 137 countries and is RICS media spokesman on technical surveying subjects. He has appeared on many international tv channels inc BBC One Show, BBC radio and is a regular contributor to various journals and as a presenter at conferences.

Currently consultant to BBC, and the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), and post Grenfell Tower is leading the RICS fire advisory group advising government and is a member of the UK Construction Industry Council Expert Panel.

Gary is Chair of the CTBUH Fire & Facades Working Group, and is leading the work on developing a global UN-backed coalition of professional bodies who aim to achieve International Fire Safety Standards particularly for high rise, high risk buildings.

# Learning Objectives

1. *Learn about the Grenfell fire*
2. *Learn what has happened since the fire*
3. *Learn about the International Fire Safety Standards (IFSS) Coalition, a UN-backed initiative.*


“With the exception of language, it would not be an exaggeration to characterise global fire safety standards as the most urgent outstanding issue in the pursuit of the public interest in global safety and performance comparability.”

Gary Strong BSc (Hons) FRICS FCI Arb CBuildE CABE FCILA FUEDI-ELAE  
Global Building Standards Director, RICS

Chair – CTBUH Fire & Facades Group

Chair – International Fire Safety Standards Coalition


# Fire-related fatalities in England



Source: Home Office



# Trends in fires, England, 1999/00 to 2016/17



# Grenfell Tower update

- First 999 call at 12.57am June 14<sup>th</sup> 2017 from flat 16 on 4<sup>th</sup> floor
- ACM cladding & insulation caused rapid fire spread
- Window filler insulation boards accentuated fire
- Windows were open causing leapfrogging
- Electrical surges history
- Single staircase 24 storey building
- 293 residents
- Some fire doors open, missing closers



# Grenfell Tower update

- Stay Put policy
- No sprinklers
- Toxic smoke in stairwell
- No working residents fire alarm
- Fire doors failed tests, closers missing
- Firefighters inside not aware of cladding fire externally
- Stay Put policy reversed at 2.47am
- 72 final death toll, carbon monoxide main cause of death
- 441 other buildings as at 30<sup>th</sup> Nov 2018





# The Roots of Grenfell



bbc.co.uk

Europe


South America

Africa

Middle East

India &  
Bangladesh

Australia



# Grenfell Tower update



Independent Expert Advisory Panel  
IRG – Industry Response Group  
Public Inquiry  
Dame Judith Hackitt Building  
Regulations and Fire Safety Review  
Criminal investigation  
7 large scale BS8414 tests  
Guidance issued to building owners by  
MHCLG continuing  
Building Safety Programme  
Building Solutions Programme



# Grenfell Tower update

- Initial focus on ACM
- Clear that little understanding of building regs requirements
- Ban on 'combustible' cladding wef 21/12/18 in England
- Scotland changes Feb 2021





Hotel building - Rostov-on-Don,  
Russia



Grenfell tower, London



Shanghai, China



Baku, Azerbaijan



Address Downtown hotel, UAE



Lacrosse tower fire, Melbourne

(kate.nguyen@unimelb.edu.au)

Building	Location	Year	Description	Damage
<b>Grenfell Tower</b>	London, UK	2017	External cladding which consisted of ACM panels with PE core	72 dead 70+ injured
<b>The Address Downtown Dubai (302m tall)</b>	Dubai, UAE	2016	An electrical short circuit on a spotlight was the cause	16 minor injuries
<b>Marina Torch (352m)</b>	Dubai, UAE	2015 & 2017	Fire initiated in the 52 <sup>nd</sup> floor and spread quickly due to high winds, combustible cladding	No injuries
<b>Tamweel Tower (160m tall)</b>	Dubai, UAE	2012	Vertical bands of exterior cladding from ground to roof level ACM panels with PE core	Repair works have begun after 3 years
<b>Saif Belhasa Building (13 stories)</b>	Dubai, UAE	2012	Cladding consisted of ACM panels with PE core	9 flats destroyed 2 injured Debris damaged 5 vehicles
<b>16 Storey apartment building</b>	Baku, Azerbaijan	2015	Rapid fire spread along the cladding. Combustible panels according to reports.	17 dead 60 injured
<b>Lacrosse Building</b>	Melbourne, Australia	2014	External wall cladding and aided by combustible material located within the wall structure quickly spread to the top of the building	No injuries
<b>18 storey building</b>	Roubaix, France	2012	Highly flammable outer cladding	1 dead 1 injured
<b>28 storey building</b>	Shanghai, China	2010	Polyurethane insulation to external walls	53 dead 90 injured
<b>Monte Carlo Hotel (32 stories)</b>	Las Vegas, US	2008	Exterior insulation and finish system which consists of a layer of expanded polystyrene foam adhered to gypsum sheathing	13 minor injuries

Cladding system tests	Result
<p data-bbox="901 97 1014 134"><b>Test 1</b></p> <p data-bbox="107 154 1811 248">cladding system formed using ACM panels with an unmodified polyethylene core (PE) and a rigid polyisocyanurate foam (PIR) insulation</p>	<p data-bbox="2142 105 2321 162"><b>Failed</b></p>
<p data-bbox="901 297 1014 334"><b>Test 2</b></p> <p data-bbox="12 354 1900 448">cladding system formed using ACM panels with unmodified polyethylene core (PE) (Cat 3 in screening tests) and stone wool insulation</p>	<p data-bbox="2142 305 2321 362"><b>Failed</b></p>
<p data-bbox="901 496 1014 534"><b>Test 3</b></p> <p data-bbox="61 554 1852 648">cladding system formed using ACM panels with a fire-retardant polyethylene core (FR) and a PIR foam insulation</p>	<p data-bbox="2142 505 2321 562"><b>Failed</b></p>
<p data-bbox="901 696 1014 733"><b>Test 7</b></p> <p data-bbox="30 753 1880 848">cladding system formed using ACM panels with fire-retardant polyethylene filler (Cat 2 in screening tests) with phenolic foam insulation</p>	<p data-bbox="2142 705 2321 762"><b>Failed</b></p>
<p data-bbox="881 896 998 933"><b>Test 4</b></p> <p data-bbox="30 953 1768 1005">cladding system formed using ACM panels with a fire-retardant (FR) core and stone wool insulation</p>	<p data-bbox="2130 905 2333 962"><b>Passed</b></p>
<p data-bbox="901 1096 1014 1133"><b>Test 5</b></p> <p data-bbox="30 1153 1895 1190">cladding system formed using ACM panels with a limited combustibility filler (A2) with PIR foam insulation</p>	<p data-bbox="2130 1090 2333 1148"><b>Passed</b></p>
<p data-bbox="901 1296 1014 1333"><b>Test 6</b></p> <p data-bbox="30 1353 1888 1428">cladding system formed using ACM panels with a limited combustibility filler (Cat 1 in screening tests) and mineral (or stone) wool insulation</p>	<p data-bbox="2130 1290 2333 1348"><b>Passed</b></p>

# Combustibility

(kate.nguyen@unimelb.edu.au)



National Construction Code  
(NCC)



International Building Code  
(IBC)



Building regulations  
(ADB)



- 1)  $t_t \leq 5 \text{ s}$
- 2)  $\Delta T_{\text{furnace}} \leq 50^\circ \text{ C}$
- 3)  $\Delta T_{\text{specimen}} \leq 50^\circ \text{ C}$

- 1) If the weight loss of specimen  $\leq 50\%$ 
  - I.  $\Delta T_{\text{furnace \& specimen}} \leq 30^\circ \text{ C}$
  - II. No flaming from the specimen after the first 30 seconds

Non-combustible

- 1)  $t_t \leq 5 \text{ s}$
- 2)  $\Delta m \leq 50\%$
- 3)  $\Delta T_{\text{furnace \& specimen}} \leq 30^\circ \text{ C}$

- 2) If the weight loss  $> 50\%$ 
  - I.  $t_t = 0 \text{ s}$
  - II.  $\Delta T_{\text{furnace \& specimen}} = 0$

Limited combustibility

- 1)  $t_t \leq 20 \text{ s}$
- 2)  $\Delta m \leq 50\%$
- 3)  $\Delta T_{\text{furnace \& specimen}} \leq 50^\circ \text{ C}$


Mat. 1	✓	✗	✗
Mat. 2	✗	✓	✗ (Limited combustibility)

AS 1530.1

ASTM E136 or ISO 1182



BS EN ISO 1182 and/or  
BS EN ISO 1716 (and EN) 13823



# Assembly Test Comparison



Test	Test Dimension	Fire Source	Peak Heat Flux to Panels*	Primary Criteria (Failure Evaluation)
<b>NFPA 285</b>	17.5 feet tall, 13.3 feet wide	Two gas burners (HRR = 1.3 MW)	40 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	Temperature via thermocouple measurement (10 ft elevation, 1000°F)
<b>BS-8414</b>	32 feet tall, 9 feet wide, with a 5 foot wide wing Wall	Wood crib (HRR = 3±0.5 MW)	75 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	Temperature via thermocouple measurement (16.4 ft elevation, 1110°F above ambient)
<b>FM 16-ft PPT</b>	16 feet tall, 3.5 feet wide	One gas burner (HRR = 360 kW)	100 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	Peak HRR > 1100 kW



1. ACM cladding with A2 filler (**category 1**) can be safe on buildings over 18m with foam insulation or stone wool insulation – really ?
2. ACM cladding with fire retardant polyethylene filler (**category 2**):
  - presents a notable fire hazard on buildings over 18m when used with rigid polymeric foam insulation based on the evidence currently available.
  - can be safe on buildings over 18m if used with non-combustible insulation (e.g. stone wool)
  - ACM cladding with unmodified polyethylene filler (**category 3**) presents a significant fire hazard on buildings over 18m with any form of insulation.



# Non ACM cladding is also an issue

---



Innovation will pose challenges



# Electrical issues

---



21st October 2017

## Residents evacuated in Walpole Road and Hamilton Road, Bournemouth on Friday after power surge sparks five fires

[http://www.bournemouthcho.co.uk/news/15610931.Hundreds\\_of\\_people\\_still\\_without\\_electricity\\_after\\_power\\_surge\\_causes\\_house\\_fires/](http://www.bournemouthcho.co.uk/news/15610931.Hundreds_of_people_still_without_electricity_after_power_surge_causes_house_fires/)

# Sprinklers

---

In Wales, sprinklers are now mandatory for ALL residential new buildings – and in Scotland above 18m (changing in Feb 2021) - but not in England, or Northern Ireland.

Recommended in AD B above 30m but NOT mandatory.

NOT retrospective.

## **1. Hyde launches £2.4bn fire safety procurement framework**

News12/07/18

A major London housing association has launched a £2.4bn fire safety procurement framework.

2. 'value engineering' = cost savings

# Fire door issues

---



**Fire door manufacturer withdraws  
products from sale following post-  
Grenfell tests**  
News 19/07/18

## **London association to remove non-ACM laminate cladding after failed test**

News11/07/18

A large London housing association is working to strip cladding from a tower block of a kind recently revealed never to have passed a large-scale test.



# Media – every day

---

[Housing associations face being stuck with dangerous cladding on leased blocks](#)

[Grenfell Inquiry day 22: description of hectic scenes within control room](#)

[Hyde launches £2.4bn fire safety procurement framework](#)

[Grenfell Inquiry day 21: account from ‘nerve centre’ of fire brigade response](#)

[Control room technology caused Grenfell response difficulties, inquiry hears](#)

[London association to remove non-ACM laminate cladding after failed test](#)

[FPA to launch alternative cladding testing regime](#)

[Widely used combustible cladding has never passed large-scale test](#)

[Grenfell Inquiry day 20: firefighter describes ‘huge volume’ of calls from trapped residents](#)

[Britain flouting human rights over ACM](#)

1. Roles and responsibilities for building safety are unclear;
2. Regulations and guidance are "ambiguous and inconsistent" and are "misunderstood and misinterpreted";
3. The process that drives compliance with the regulations are "weak and complex with poor record keeping and change control in too many cases";
4. Competence (of people in the system) is "patchy";
5. Product testing, labelling and marketing is "opaque and insufficient";
6. Residents' voices go unheard



## 53 principal recommendations:

- a stronger and tougher regulatory framework for higher risk residential buildings (HRRBs) that are 10 storeys
- a Joint Competent Authority (JCA) comprising fire and rescue authorities, Local Authority Building Standards and HSE to oversee better management of safety risks (through safety cases) across their entire life cycle
- introduction of a safety case approach & permissions
- clear responsibilities to actively manage on-going safety during occupation



# Dame Judith Hackitt final report Building a Safer Future

---



- mandatory incident reporting
- key roles & responsibilities
- overhaul of guidance
- digital records – inc BIM
- stronger enforcement & criminal sanctions
- effective leadership & competence for key roles
- stronger testing, labelling & traceability of products
- empowering residents' voices



Client

Principal Designer

Principal Contractor

Health & Safety File


Notification to HSE

Criminal prosecutions



Buildings insurance

PI insurance



From investors to the public, they offer significant benefits to different stakeholders:

## Professional advisors

enhance performance  
and reputation

1

## Investors

comparability of  
sound investments on a  
like for like basis

2

## Multinationals

better understanding  
of property portfolio

3

## Developers

ability to attract  
new clients from all  
markets/regions

4

## Governments

political, market transparency  
and investment  
potential


5

## Public

confidence in  
governments  
and buildings

6

# International standards – working together





## Valuation

- Based on open market value
- Use best comparables available
- Public sentiment is against dangerous buildings
- Global investors very aware of this as a global issue
- Local investors very aware
- Banks very aware of inconsistencies
- So **no investment and inability to raise finance**

# IFSS - International Fire Safety Standards



# Why is there a need for IFSS?

Property of all types is built and managed differently around the world, which leads to:

- Difficulty in providing consistent and transparent information from one market to the next
- Inconsistency further undermining existing international standards such as IFRS and IVS
- A degree of uncertainty in property markets
- Uncertainty for international financial investors
- Uncertainty by the public leading to political instability

# Fire Safety in Buildings

Fire safety in buildings has two arenas:

- Design and construction – providing the fire safety infrastructure
- Building in use – using and maintaining the fire safety infrastructure

## Fire safety design needs to address:

- Holistically the whole building, not just cladding, on a fire engineered approach
- Fire prevention and arson resistance
- Fire detection and alarm
- Means of escape/evacuation
- Structural fire resilience
- Fire growth control incl fire suppression
- Fire fighting facilities
- Fire engineers input
- Supervision of construction
- Competency

- Fire risk assessment
- Building management
  - Regular inspection, reporting & testing
  - Maintenance
- Training
- Existing buildings – incremental improvements
- Competency

# What are International Fire Safety Standards (IFSS)?



IFSS will offer a global solution to:

- Address current inconsistencies in the way property is designed, built and managed for fire safety
- Ensure different types of property including offices, residential, retail and industrial are safe for users
- Ensure confidence in property investment

IFSS will be implemented by all coalition organisations, through their members.

## Consistency

- Consistent standards enable governments & clients to accurately quantify risks and other sustainability measures.
- Enable governments to reassure the public and investors



## Transparency

- Improved confidence in national market for foreign direct investment at all stages of the property lifecycle.

## Comparability

- Removes need for multiple differing standards within countries (such as the UK), and allows for better foreign direct investment assessment.

## Future proof


- Utilising international best practice early as the world moves to this set of standards, as it has done with IFRS and other international standards.

## Why not ISO ?

- Takes too long and costs too much
- ISO set up for products not professional behaviour
- IP owned by ISO and cost (of downloading) is a barrier
- Any one country can veto a standard
- IFSS Coalition members develop the standards and ensure it's adoption

- **These issues need a team approach**
- **Fire engineers are key to the solutions**
- **Opportunity to build a global fire engineering profession is huge, particularly in high risk buildings**
- **Professional bodies must collaborate**





Get involved –  
[gstrong@rics.org](mailto:gstrong@rics.org)



Professional standards are

Good for business

Good for govts

Good for the public